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In many cases poor performers must receive a warning in the form of a
strike prior to exclusion. This study provides a comparison between a two-
strike exclusion policy and a zero-tolerance exclusion policy as a means for
fostering cooperation in groups. The results from our experiment suggest that
group members tend to cooperate more after receiving a strike. However,
requiring group members to issue strikes to one another prior to exclusion
seemed to be less effective than allowing for exclusion without prior receipt of
strikes.
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1 Introduction
The literature on exclusion has only examined forms of exclusion without the need
for issuing prior notice. Such forms of exclusion are comparable to the zero-tolerance
approach utilized by US companies to dismiss employees for poor performance. How-
ever, there are cases where poor performers are notified about their performance
prior to exclusion. For example, in many workplaces if an employee is accused of
performing poorly or in a negligible manner, they may be subjected to a Perfor-
mance Improvement Plan.1 While the employee’s performance is being evaluated,
they must adhere to the necessary improvements, otherwise they will receive a series
of strikes. In this example, employers have grounds to dismiss an employee if they
have received the necessary number of strikes while on the plan.
One could argue that the 𝑛-strike exclusion policy may be more efficient than the
zero-tolerance exclusion policy. We focus on two-strikes without loss of general-
ity and test in the lab. The exclusion of potentially valuable group members will
inevitably have a negative impact on the welfare of the group as the productive
capacity of the group will no longer be as large. A two-strike exclusion policy ad-
dresses this inefficiency by requiring group members to issue strikes to one another
prior to excluding them. Thus, group members are now able to disclose their dis-
approval to one another which might provide sufficient incentives for cooperation
without necessitating the exclusion of any members of the group.2
On the other hand, in a setting where we require group members to issue strikes
to one another prior to exclusion the initial level of cooperation might be relatively
low as there is no immediate threat of exclusion prior to receiving a strike. After
group members receive strikes from one another the level of cooperation may rise
to a significantly higher level. Whether cooperation levels rise enough to justify
the use of a two-strike exclusion policy instead of a zero-tolerance exclusion policy
is difficult to establish. Our experiment allows us to determine which of the two
exclusion policies is most effective in fostering cooperation in groups.
This paper adds to the emerging literature on exclusion in groups. Neuhofer and
Kittel (2015) and Solda and Villeval (2019) found strong evidence to suggest that
lengthening the duration of exclusion has a positive effect on the level of cooperation
within groups. Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) and Maier-Rigaud et al. (2010) used
a majority voting rule to determine exclusion in groups. Whereas, Croson et al.
(2015) simply excluded the lowest contributor in each group after each period. More
recently Kopányi-Peuker et al. (2018) varied the periods for which one could be
excluded. In all instances the threat of exclusion appeared to have a prevailing
positive impact on cooperation regardless of the length of exclusion, or how the
individual facing exclusion was determined. To our knowledge, this is the first
experimental study evaluating a two-strike exclusion policy.
1Performance Improvement Plans are mostly used in offices around the UK, Europe and Aus-
tralia.
2Masclet et al. (2003), Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and Rege and Telle (2004) have shown that
people tend to behave more cooperatively when faced with the threat of disapproval. Moreover,
Sheremeta et al. (2011) and Charness and Yang (2014) provide evidence to suggest that individuals
will cooperate more after being given a second chance to participate in a group.
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2 Experimental design and procedures
102 students from the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) participated in a
study which contained six experimental sessions of a computerized experiment, pro-
grammed in z-Tree; see Fischbacher (2007). The experiment was conducted in the
UTS Behavioural Lab. Participants were recruited through ORSEE; see Greiner
(2015). This experiment was a between subject design. The following table outlines
the overall structure of the experiment.
Table 1: Treatment summary
Treatment Number of groups Games played
No exclusion 6 10 period game + 10 period game
Exclusion without strikes 6 10 period game + 10 period game
Exclusion with strikes 5 10 period game + 10 period game
In each treatment subjects participated in a repeated linear public good game. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to groups of 6 and stayed in the same groups
throughout each 10-period game. In each period, participants first had to simulta-
neously choose how much to contribute to the Group account out of an endowment
of 10 Francs. 1 Franc was equal to 0.025 AUD. The payoff for participant 𝑖 was
calculated according to the following function:




where 𝑔 is the contribution to the Group account. The choice of these parameter
values ensures that the social optimum is for everyone to fully invest in the Group
account, while the individuals’ strictly dominant strategy is to invest nothing.
After the contribution stage each group member was informed about the contribu-
tion levels of the other members of their group. However, unlike in Maier-Rigaud
et al. (2010), contributions made by other group members were shown in a fixed
order on the screen in all treatments. Thus, it was possible for each group member
to track other group members’ contributions over time.3 This measure was taken
to control for the reputation effect across all treatments. In the exclusion without
strikes treatment, after examining the contributions made by others, each group
member could then assign disapproval points to exclude other group members or to
refrain from assigning disapproval points. Each group member was able to allocate
any whole number of disapproval points between 0 and 10 to as many members of
the group as they wished to.4
In both exclusion treatments group members were only informed about the total
number of disapproval points they received upon exclusion. Participants needed to
receive more than 50% of the maximum number of disapproval points that could
possibly be assigned to be excluded, i.e. at least 26 out of 50 if the group consisted
of six members. Excluded members continued to receive 10 Francs for all remaining
3Further to this, participants were provided record sheets to fill out to enhance their ability to
track contributions made by other group members over time.
4This voting format has been implemented in other studies such as Masclet et al. (2003) and
Sheremeta et al. (2011). It allows for richer empirical analyses as the dependent variable is subject
to a larger degree of variation.
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periods and did not participate in future play of the game. The direct effect of
excluding a group member was the decrease in group size. Hence, the decision to
exclude a group member always reduced the potential maximum contribution to the
Group account.
The exclusion with strikes treatment was very similar to the exclusion without strikes
treatment described above, however, there was one crucial difference between the
two treatments. The difference was that in the exclusion with strikes treatment
participants had to receive a strike prior to being excluded. If a group member
received more than half the maximum number of disapproval points possible but
had not previously received a strike, then that individual would receive a strike;
if a group member had previously received a strike, then that individual would be
excluded in the same way as in the treatment without strikes. Note, after a group
member had received a strike the group was made aware at every feedback stage that
this individual had previously received a strike. This allowed each group member
to understand the consequences of their disapproval assignment.
Our experimental design yields the following testable hypotheses regarding the con-
tributions made towards the Group account by participants.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals will contribute more after receiving a strike than prior
to receiving a strike.
Hypothesis 2: Individual contributions will be highest in the exclusion without
strikes treatment, lower in the exclusion with strikes treatment, and lowest in the
no exclusion treatment.
Hypothesis 3: Contributions at the group level will be lowest in the no exclusion
treatment. It is unclear which of the two exclusion treatments will yield higher
group level contributions.
For a detailed derivation of the above hypotheses see appendix A.
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3 Results
3.1 Individual level contributions
The following figure illustrates how individuals responded to receiving strikes as well
as the average individual contribution level across treatments.5
Figure 1: Individual contribution levels across treatments
The pre-strike contribution level for an individual represents the average of all con-
tributions made towards the Group account by an individual prior to receiving a
strike. The post-strike contribution level for an individual represents the average of
all contributions made towards the Group account after receiving a strike.6 Figure 1
indicates that individuals tended to contribute more after receiving a strike (6.25 vs.
7.33). We estimated a random-effect model of individual contribution on treatment
dummy-variables and on the dummy-variable for whether an individual previously
received a strike, while clustering errors at the group level. Our estimates indicate
that the response to strikes was significant (𝑝-value < 0.05 for periods 1-10 and
periods 11-20). Refer to Table B.1 in appendix B for more details.
Result 1: Individual contributions increased in response to receiving a strike.
Result 1 provides strong support for the first hypothesis that after receiving a strike,
group members suddenly faced a genuine threat of exclusion. Hence, stricken group
members made contributions towards the Group account as if they were operating
with the fear of exclusion.
Our estimates indicate that individual contributions were higher in both exclusion
treatments than in the no exclusion treatment (𝑝-value < 0.05 for periods 1-10
and periods 11-20 for both treatment dummies). The coefficient estimates for the
treatment dummies also indicate that individual contributions were higher in the
5Note, we did not include observations relating to excluded individuals in our average contri-
bution calculations in the Figure 1.
6Note, we did not include observations where individuals received their first strike after the
8th period in the game because strikes received after the 8th period should have no effect on
contribution behaviour. We also did not include contributions that were made in the final period
in our calculation of the average contribution due to end-game effects.
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exclusion without strikes treatment than in the exclusion with strikes treatment.
The post-strike contribution level was not significantly different to the individual
level contribution in the exclusion without strikes treatment.7 Refer to Table B.1 in
appendix B for more details.
Result 2: On average individuals contributed the most towards the Group account
in the exclusion without strikes treatment, less in the exclusion with strikes treatment
and the least in the no exclusion treatment.
Result 2 provides support for the second hypothesis. Specifically, participants be-
haved much more cooperatively when faced with a genuine threat of exclusion. In
the exclusion without strikes treatment participants only faced a threat of exclusion
after they received a strike. This in turn explains why contributions made towards
the Group account were higher in the exclusion without strikes treatment than in
the exclusion with strikes treatment.
3.2 Group level contributions
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of contributions made at the group
level.
Figure 2: Contributions at the group level
We estimated a random-effect model of group level contribution on treatment dummy-
variables, while clustering errors at the session level. Our estimates indicate that
contributions made towards the Group account at the group level were higher in
both exclusion treatments than in the no exclusion treatment (𝑝-value < 0.05 for
periods 1-10 and periods 11-20 for both treatment dummies). The coefficient esti-
mates for the treatment dummies also indicate that contributions made towards the
7The difference in the estimated coefficients between the two exclusion treatments was statis-
tically significant for periods 1-10 but not for periods 11-20.
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Group account at the group level were higher in the exclusion without strikes treat-
ment than the exclusion with strikes treatment.8 Refer to Table B.2 in appendix B
for more details.
Result 3: On average contributions made at the group level towards the Group
account were highest in the exclusion without strikes treatment, lower in the exclusion
with strikes treatment and the lowest in the no exclusion treatment.
Result 3 provides support for hypothesis 3. This result highlights that efficiency was
highest in the exclusion without strikes treatment and lowest in the no exclusion
treatment. Hence, the positive effect that the threat of exclusion had on cooperation
seemed to overshadow the negative impact on overall efficiency derived from the
inability to signal disapproval in the zero-tolerance setting.
We found no significant difference in the prevalence of exclusion between the two
exclusion treatments. The average prevailing group size in the exclusion with and
without strikes treatments was 4.60 and 5.08 respectively.
4 Conclusion
Prior to conducting this research, the impact that a two-strike exclusion policy would
have in fostering cooperation in groups was unclear. We found that individuals tend
to cooperate more after receiving a strike. This finding highlights the possibility for
undesirable group members to rehabilitate themselves without the need for suspen-
sion or expulsion. However, requiring group members to issue strikes to one another
prior to exclusion seemed to be less effective than allowing for exclusion without
prior receipt of strikes. As a result, the zero-tolerance approach commonly utilized
by US companies to dismiss employees for poor performance may indeed be the
most effective and efficient form of exclusion for fostering cooperation in groups.
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A Explanation for hypotheses
Subgame perfect equilibrium
As highlighted in Maier-Rigaud et al. (2010), employing standard game theoretic
techniques will not allow for derivation of any meaningful predictions. To illustrate
this point, consider a setting where it is not necessary to issue strikes prior to ex-
clusion. It is evident that in the last period all players remaining in the game will
contribute zero towards the Group account, so that the payoff is 10 for all players
(including the excluded ones). By backwards induction, cooperation unravels from
the end until the beginning of the game and the only requirement for subgame per-
fection is for each member of the group to contribute zero in every period. Any
configuration of disapproval assignment and group sizes can be part of an equi-
librium, that is, there exist a multiplicity of equilibria with different disapproval
assignment levels and corresponding different group sizes throughout the game. A
similar rationale can be used to stipulate the same behaviour should be expected
when an individual can only be excluded after they have received a strike. Hence,
subgame perfection predicts no difference in the level of cooperation across the three
treatments.
Explanation for hypothesis 1
Suppose the average contribution made towards the Group account when group
members do not face a threat of exclusion is 𝑔𝑁𝐸, and the average contribution made
towards the Group account when group members do face a threat of exclusion is
𝑔𝐸.
9 Essentially, the threat of exclusion raises the cost of free riding. As a result, we
expect group members to contribute less towards the Group account when they do
not face a threat of exclusion than when they are faced with a threat of exclusion.
Research conducted by Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), Maier-Rigaud et al. (2010),
Croson et al. (2015) provides strong evidence to support this claim. In light of
this, we assume that 𝑔𝐸 > 𝑔𝑁𝐸. Consider the treatment where we only allow for
a group member to be excluded after they have received a strike. Before a group
member receives a strike, they face no threat of exclusion. However, after a group
member receives a strike that group member suddenly faces a genuine threat of
exclusion. Essentially, this implies that after receiving a strike the representative
group member switches from contributing 𝑔𝑁𝐸 to 𝑔𝐸. Given the fact that we have
assumed 𝑔𝐸 > 𝑔𝑁𝐸, we can claim that individuals will contribute more after receiving
a strike than prior to receiving a strike.
Explanation for hypothesis 2
Suppose the public good game is repeated finitely for 𝑇 + 1 periods and the repre-
sentative group member receives a strike in period 𝑡 ∈ [1, 2, 3,..., 𝑇 +1]. Note, in the
final period of the game there can be no threat of exclusion as the game will cease
to continue after this period. Since there is never a threat of exclusion in the final
period of the game, we expect contributions to be the same in this period across
all three treatments. As a result, we will focus on analysing average contributions
over 𝑇 periods. For 𝑡 periods the representative group member will contribute 𝑔𝑁𝐸
9Note, we do not include excluded individuals in the calculation of average individual contri-
bution.
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as they face no threat of exclusion. For the remaining 𝑇 − 𝑡 periods the represen-
tative group member faces a genuine threat of exclusion, hence, they contribute 𝑔𝐸.
Therefore, the average contribution made by the representative group member in
the exclusion with strikes treatment, 𝑔𝐸𝑆, over 𝑇 periods can be expressed by the
following:
𝑔𝐸𝑆 =
𝑡𝑔𝑁𝐸 + (𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑔𝐸
𝑇
.
Now that we have derived an expression for the average contribution level in the
exclusion with strikes treatment it is possible to make comparisons between average
contribution levels in each of the three treatments. First, we must evaluate the
difference in average contributions between the exclusion without strikes and the
exclusion with strikes treatments. We have that
𝑔𝐸 − 𝑔𝐸𝑆 = 𝑔𝐸 −






Recall, 𝑔𝐸 > 𝑔𝑁𝐸 by assumption. We also know by construction that group members
will never receive strikes prior to the first period, i.e. 𝑡 > 0. Therefore, it must follow
that 𝑔𝐸 > 𝑔𝐸𝑆.
Now we must compare average contribution levels between the exclusion with strikes
treatment and the no exclusion treatment. We have that
𝑔𝐸𝑆 − 𝑔𝑁𝐸 =




(𝑇 − 𝑡)(𝑔𝐸 − 𝑔𝑁𝐸)
𝑇
.
If a group member receives their first strike in the second last period, 𝑇 , then they
cannot be excluded in the final period of the game. Therefore, it is futile giving
another member of your group a strike in any period after the third last period of
the game as it will most likely not alter their behaviour. For this reason, we believe
group members will typically receive a strike at some point before the penultimate
period, i.e. 𝑡 < 𝑇 . Combining this with the assumption that 𝑔𝐸 > 𝑔𝑁𝐸 leads to the
proposition that 𝑔𝐸𝑆 > 𝑔𝑁𝐸. As a result, we expect 𝑔𝐸 > 𝑔𝐸𝑆 > 𝑔𝑁𝐸.
Explanation for hypothesis 3
We established in hypothesis 1 that individual level contributions towards the pro-
vision of the public good should be higher in the two exclusion treatments than in
the no exclusion treatment. In turn, we also expect this to be true at the group
level.
In the discussion that follows we highlight the trade-offs between the exclusion with
and without strikes treatments. First, consider a setting where we allow for exclu-
sion without prior receipt of strikes. In such settings group members might behave
extremely cooperatively throughout the course of the game as they will constantly
be wary of the threat of exclusion. In contrast, in a setting where we require group
members to issue strikes to one another prior to exclusion the initial level of coop-
eration might be relatively low as there is no immediate threat of exclusion prior to
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receiving a strike. After group members receive strikes from one another the level
of cooperation may rise to a significantly higher level. However, this increase in
cooperation may be too little too late. Assuming that the group size is fairly stable
across treatments the fact that group members might behave more cooperatively
in the exclusion without strikes treatment implies that contributions made at the
group level will also be higher in this treatment. Note, this reasoning is in line with
hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 states that contributions at the individual level will be
higher in the exclusion without strikes treatment than in the exclusion with strikes
treatment. Consequently, one might expect to generate this result at the group level
as well.
It is important to highlight that the exclusion of potentially valuable group mem-
bers will inevitably reduce the productive capacity of the group. In light of this,
group members operating in the exclusion without strikes treatment may be re-
luctant to exclude others as they may be wary of the negative repercussions. To
illustrate the inefficiencies that may arise in the exclusion without strikes treatment
consider the following example. Suppose we have a group of six individuals and
five of them consistently contribute 90% of their endowment while the sixth group
member consistently contributes 50% of their endowment towards the provision of
the public good. In a setting where group members are not able to issue strikes to
one another prior to exclusion it is likely that the sixth group member’s relatively
small contribution will be tolerated, as the group would prefer to keep this relatively
small contributor in the group than to exclude them from the group. A two-strike
exclusion policy may address this inefficiency. By requiring group members to issue
strikes to one another prior to excluding them, group members are now able to dis-
close their disapproval to one another. Masclet et al. (2003), Andreoni and Petrie
(2004) and Rege and Telle (2004) have shown that people tend to behave more co-
operatively when faced with the threat of disapproval. Moreover, Sheremeta et al.
(2011) and Charness and Yang (2014) provide evidence to suggest that individuals
will cooperate more after being given a second chance to participate in a group.
Hence, the two-strike exclusion policy may provide sufficient incentives for cooper-
ation without necessitating the exclusion of any members of the group. As a result,
requiring group members to issue strikes to one another prior to exclusion may in
fact be more efficient than not having this requirement.
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B Estimation tables
In Table B.1 we estimate a random-effects regression of individual contribution on
treatment dummy-variables and a dummy-variable for whether an individual previ-
ously received a strike, while clustering errors at the group level. Note, the baseline
treatment is the no exclusion treatment.
Table B.1: Treatment comparison – Individual level contributions
Variable Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20
Exclusion without strikes 2.552*** 2.552*** 3.870*** 3.870***
(0.657) (0.657) (0.751) (0.752)
Exclusion with strikes 1.591** 1.404** 2.786*** 2.365***
(0.265) (0.634) (0.747) (0.793)
Received strike 1.323*** 1.786***
(0.213) (0.642)
Constant 5.036*** 5.036*** 4.375*** 4.375***
(0.573) (0.574) (0.521) (0.522)
No. of observations 991 991 980 980
Prob > 𝜒2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1
In Table B.2 we estimate a random-effects regression of group level contribution on
treatment dummy-variables, while clustering errors at the session level. Note, the
baseline treatment is the no exclusion treatment.
Table B.2: Treatment comparison – Group level contributions
Variable Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20
Exclusion without strikes 13.007*** 18.064***
(2.674) (3.855)




No. of observations 170 170
Prob > 𝜒2 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1
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